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COLLECTIVE SECURITY TREATY
ORGANIZATION: RESPONSIBLE SECURITY

(Synopsis of Report of Institute of Contemporary Development)

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At the current stage of development of international relations and in the context of the modernization of security mechanisms, new promising actors are emerging. And the **Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)** can be characterized as such.

CSTO, which was established on the basis of the Collective Security Treaty (concluded in May 1992) and took on its present organizational structure (Charter, budget, secretariat, working bodies and structures, etc.) in 2002-2003, positions itself as *a kind of a new multifunctional security organization*.¹

The multifunctional nature of CSTO and its new kind mean, first of all, a combination of two “baskets” of functions in one structure: (1) counteracting traditional external military threats (establishing a military alliance linking up the military infrastructure of the seven member countries), on one hand, and (2) responding to new threats and challenges (drug trafficking, illegal migration, extremism, terrorism, etc.), on the other. This combination of functions has the potential to turn CSTO into a unique mechanism that could play an important role in the formation of new security architecture in Eurasia.

From the start, the Collective Security Treaty has primarily been a treaty of collective defense, which is why CSTO collaboration is based on *a strategy of response to “traditional” security threats* that could lead to a nuclear or large-scale conventional war. With the aim of responding to such types of threats, the organization has foreseen the formation of three regional coalition force groups.

Two groups have been formed and are active at present – the Eastern European (Russia–Belorussia) and the Caucasian (Russia–Armenia). In order to respond to threats in Central Asia, a different kind of formation has been established, the Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF), which includes an aircraft component (based in Kant, Kyrgyzstan).

¹ The Collective Security Treaty was signed on May 15, 1992, in Tashkent by the heads of six CIS countries: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Azerbaijan joined the treaty in September 1993, followed by Georgia and Belarus in December of the same year. In 1999 Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan did not extend their membership in the Treaty. After CSTO was set up to coordinate member state interaction under the treaty, Uzbekistan again joined the six other members of the Collective Security Treaty in 2006. Current member states of the treaty are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The *Crisis Response Strategy* that developed toward the end of 2010 stipulates collective measures for “protecting the security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty of CSTO member states as well as jointly responding to challenges and threats to collective security and emergency situations”. The Collective Rapid Response Forces (CRRF) and Peacekeeping Forces (PF) are called upon for implementation of this strategy.

CSTO began working on its *Counter-Terrorism Strategy* even before the terrorists’ attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. Documents from 2000 demonstrate the intention of CSTO members to enhance coordination of measures “on joint response to new challenges and threats to national, regional and international security with an emphasis placed on the unwavering fight against international terrorism.”

CSTO’s *Anti-Narcotics Strategy* deserves special attention. Since 2003, each year the organization has carried out Operation “Channel”, a comprehensive anti-narcotics trafficking operation. In 2008 it obtained the status of an ongoing regional anti-narcotics operation. Its goals include the detection and interception of channels of narcotics contraband and their precursors along the Northern Route and part of the Balkan Route.

In line with the organization’s Charter, one more area of collaboration for CSTO countries is dealing with *the issue of illegal migration from third countries*. The first joint operation, dubbed “Illegal”, was carried out in 2006.

In recent years CSTO has been actively developing a program aimed at forming *an information security system* for member states to address such threats as the dissemination of information prohibited by national legislation (promotion of terrorism, extremism, calls to forcibly overthrow constitutional governments, slander, etc.).

A system for *military and technical cooperation and joint training of military personnel* has been established. Furthermore, CSTO has created *mechanisms for foreign-policy coordination*, and the Parliamentary Assembly of CSTO is functioning.

The events which took place in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 have had a major impact on the development of CSTO’s legal base and response mechanisms. Although at the time of those events the organization had response instruments (CRDF, CRRF), legally it could not intervene, as there was no official appeal from Kyrgyzstan requesting CSTO interference. Stabilization processes in Kyrgyzstan were discussed at an informal CSTO summit in Yerevan in August 2010. A decision was made to develop amendments to the organization’s founding documents with the aim of creating a more effective CSTO mechanism for crisis response in similar situations in the future. At the meeting of CSTO Collective

Security Council (CSC) on December 10, 2010, in Moscow, the corresponding changes were made to the Collective Security Treaty and the organization's Charter. Chapter VIII of the Charter was amended with the following provision: member states are to "take measures to provide for the establishment and functioning within the organization of a system for response to crisis situations which threaten the security, stability, territorial integrity and sovereignty of member states."

Thus, CSTO is in the process of developing a legal basis for responding not only to external threats to sovereignty but also to domestic crises. Furthermore, in case of conflict situations, CSTO can now get around the principle of obligatory consensus when making decisions, as the organization moves toward an arrangement by which decisions can be made by a limited number of participants with no strong opposition from abstaining member states that do not demonstrate interest in a particular problem. Documents related to crisis response are in the process of being ratified and have not yet taken effect.

After changes were made to the Collective Security Treaty and the organization's Charter, it became obvious that the doctrine basis for CSTO's functioning, and particularly the Collective Security Concept adopted in 1995, was significantly outdated. Subsequently, a decision was made to develop a new version of this document as well as to develop a Collective Security Strategy and a Strategic and Operative Planning System within CSTO. A group of experts from member states are currently working on a set of these documents.

At present, CSTO's various structures and mechanisms have to a certain extent proved their functionality. However, despite this obvious progress, CSTO constantly faces accusations of inefficiency from experts and politicians due to an absence of any real operations. However, it would be appropriate to recall that NATO carried out its first military operation in 1995, a full 46 years after the organization's creation. And this lack of operations was viewed as a sign of NATO's efficiency as a mechanism of deterrence. In this regard, CSTO's joint forces – CRDF and CRRF – have a deterrence function also in relation to extremists' activity originating from the territory of Afghanistan.

Without a doubt, the organization has some problems. CSTO, like many other regional organizations, was not formed according to a unified political strategy but rather as a balance of many individual strategies in different areas. As a result, it has perhaps become too multifunctional. At a certain stage of the development of any coalition, multifunctionality helps to ensure structural unity through maximum flexibility. But if in the future organizational structures fail to adapt to new challenges, such political flexibility can turn into weakness, as was the case with structures of the CIS.

In the modern globalized world, due to challenges and threats that to a large extent are trans-boundary in nature, it is impossible to be an efficient regional security organization while focusing solely on internal stabilization functions in a given geographical area of responsibility. In the past few decades on the international arena the collective actions of states have frequently had priority over individual actions. Thus, even problems of domestic destabilization are with increasing frequency becoming the focus of the collective response of the international community.

Russia cannot remove itself from the processes now underway. It may in one form or another participate by joining the efforts of international organizations and coalitions as one more state. Another option is to use a *collective crisis response instrument*, namely CSTO, including in areas outside the organization's own region.

In turn, CSTO's transformation into a powerful international response instrument will require a true enhancement of the efficiency of the organization. This, however, is difficult to accomplish without finding a solution for two interrelated problems: (1) consolidation and strengthening of the intra-organizational discipline of member states, and (2) adaptation to trans-regional response needs.

The problem of internal discipline in an organization often contributes to its inefficiency. CSTO tries to hush disputes between member states, but this sometimes only exacerbates the situation. Instead of seeing a full-fledged regional security organization, where real debates take place and each state has equal political authority, external observers (presumably comparing this with the US role in NATO) draw conclusions about the supposed neo-imperialist ambitions of Russia, which is purportedly imposing its own priorities on the organization. If the situation were such, then Uzbekistan, for example, could not actually block some initiatives for CSTO's development. In particular, outside experts should take note of the fact that Tashkent's "special position" concerning the Afghan issue is what prevents CSTO from adopting measures to prepare to a more effective response to the situation, which is sure to change as troops of the international coalition withdraw from Afghanistan. If Russia could really push through any decision, problems concerning internal discipline would never occur.

Problems related to internal discipline and the lack of political will necessary to put CSTO's potential to use could stem from the fact that member states may have no clear understanding of the reason for this cooperative endeavor. In this regard, it is necessary to develop specific goals and values that are comprehensible to both member states and international partners. The lack of a consolidating idea affects not only internal discipline but also relations with other international organizations, which cannot understand CSTO's mission.

The mechanisms and structures of NATO and the EU serve to support a liberal ideology, which serves as the basis of these organizations' activity. If NATO or EU member states take part in operations outside their prescribed area of responsibility, they understand that they do this not only and not so much for their own security but also in the name of liberal values, democracy and respect for human rights. Unlike the EU and NATO, non-Western security organizations are characterized by substantial ideological diversity among member states, and a democratic political system is not a criterion for membership.

Still recovering from the aftereffects of the financial crisis, revolutions in the Arab world and "color revolutions" elsewhere, for post-Soviet states *the idea of domestic and socio-economic stability coupled with adherence to all international norms and maxims of law* is becoming more topical.

Common goals and values will undoubtedly support the unity of CSTO and enhancing its efficiency, which in turn will have a positive effect on cooperation with other regional organizations. At present CSTO has well-developed contacts with a number of international organizations, from the UN to the Red Cross, but this cooperation is mostly protocol. Substantial cooperation in specific areas and programs should be developed.

At present not only CSTO but also numerous regional and international organizations are actively engaging new challenges and threats. At the same time, these efforts are not producing a synergetic, cumulative effect (greater efficiency as a result of the concerted actions of different structures) but rather are leading to duplication of functions and financing. *Revision of existing programs is necessary, as is reassessment of mechanisms for responding to new challenges and threats within the framework of different organizations with the aim of detecting redundancy and optimization of material and non-material resource use.*

Taking into account the high degree of overlapping membership and intersecting functions of such organizations as CSTO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), certain states inevitably face excessive financial burdens. Redundant programs and mechanisms in the post-Soviet space should be closely analyzed, which could provide a basis for developing a program aimed at the *gradual transformation of redundant formats of cooperation* for responding to new challenges and threats *into mutually complementary formats.*

For example, parallels in CSTO and SCO activities concerning a range of new threats and challenges are evident for the organizations' leadership. However, existing mechanisms of coordination of CSTO and SCO activities are limited to information exchange between the secretariats. To address the functional

overlap issue, CSTO has proposed officially adding Chinese representatives to the already established mechanisms of consultations on anti-terrorism activity and other matters of regional security.

Russia could take the initiative on development of a review and optimization program, as it makes a considerable contribution to the budgets of both regional organizations and at the same time has a substantial influence on their agendas. A program of expense optimization is especially topical in light of the relative decline of the economies of CIS member states following the world financial and economic crisis. Another factor here is the change in the strategy of the US in Afghanistan, what will probably lead to more threats in this region.

Russia should preliminarily decide on national priorities concerning post-Soviet regional organizations. For example, on a political level preference is given to SCO as an organization with significant potential of international influence. In practice, however, multifunctional cooperation in the sphere of regional security with real results can be achieved through the framework of CSTO.

In this regard, the following steps could prove useful as a part of efforts to increase the efficiency of regional cooperation in the post-Soviet space.

- *Revision of existing mechanisms and tools* for integration and responding to new threats and challenges; compilation of a list of redundant and duplicating formats and analysis of their efficiency for addressing specific security problems.
- *Development of a program for optimization of financing* response measures to deal with new challenges and threats, including those in post-Soviet space, within the frames of regional organizations (possibly including a gradual reduction of financing of duplicating formats and programs with a simultaneous increase of financing of mutually complementary formats).
- *Continued legalization of relations between regional post-Soviet organizations* – detailed cooperation agreements with enumeration of specific programs and mechanisms, as well as cooperation methods, should be developed.
- Identification of programs of international (extra-regional) organizations' overlapping with programs of organizations in the post-Soviet space; estimation of the potential efficiency of cooperation in specific areas; *development of a legal mechanism of cooperation on a program level.*

If regulation of cooperation between regional organizations in the post-Soviet space is seen as a difficult but still achievable goal, the possibilities of widening of cooperation with extra-regional organizations are more limited.

The EU and NATO's refusal to cooperate with post-Soviet security organizations on an institutional level is explained by existing values conflicts, which have not been overcome despite Russia's calls to back away from the ideological confrontation of the Cold War period. At the same time, even with background conflicts concerning political goals and values, there is concurrence of positions on the need to respond to new challenges and threats, including those in the post-Soviet space. Moreover, new challenges are, as a rule, caused by non-governmental actors, what makes it possible to step away from an excessively ideologically driven perception.

In all likelihood, in order to overcome some difficult issues, consideration should be given to the feasibility of developing *grass-root level cooperation* on the path toward a *possible institutional and legal arrangement* of cooperation of post-Soviet organizations with international ones, above all else, with the EU and NATO.

The serious difficulties of this process are self-evident. Nonetheless, work on the international track should be activated. The dynamics of changes in the global situation and intensification of common threats and challenges require new approaches and significant joint efforts, accompanied by an overcoming of various phobias and narrow-interest mindsets.

Interaction with *NATO* is one of the most problematic areas of the international political dimension of CSTO's activities.

For the perspective of international law, CSTO can be categorized as the same type of organization as NATO: a regional multi-state security organization with authorities corresponding to those indicated in Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Both organizations are recognized as such by the UN.

In contrast to NATO, CSTO already has a legal framework for developing cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance. In 2004 CSTO's Council on Collective Security adopted a decision on the key areas of dialogue and cooperation with NATO.

But a reciprocal move on NATO's part did not follow. The following year one particular issue was highlighted in the general cooperation agenda – combating narcotics trafficking. But this proposal for cooperation also went unanswered.

The North Atlantic Alliance is still in no hurry to establish institutionalized relations, preferring rather to work separately with CSTO members within the

framework of the Russia–NATO Council, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace program (PfP).

CSTO is not mentioned in NATO’s new Strategy Concept. But it does indicate that Euro-Atlantic security “is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organizations around the globe.” At the same time, the specific list of international organizations for partnership is limited to the United Nations and European Union, with reference to enhanced cooperation within the context of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. However, this document does pay particular attention to opportunities for enhancing cooperation with Russia.

At the same time, the Strategic Concept speaks of the importance of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace program, which include all member states of CSTO. However, it seems important that partnerships are to be enhanced through “flexible formats” across and beyond existing frameworks for cooperation. So it seems that there is a conceptual premise for establishing relations between NATO and CSTO.

However, in contrast to Russia–NATO relations, along the CSTO–NATO track we see neither perceptible debates nor purposeful exchanges of opinions, not to mention constructive and specific proposals, perhaps with the exception of the Afghan issue.

With this in mind, we should note that both organizations with their respective fundamental documents have the opportunity to develop flexible forms of interaction. Considering the existing hindrances to relationship building, perhaps it would be prudent to develop cooperation through specific programs and focus areas as a starting point on the path toward possible institutionally formalized cooperation.

The need to launch discussions on the CSTO–NATO track arises out of the various scenarios for the development of the international situation. There are difficult issues which must be addressed, including those which skeptics say are preventing the two organizations from establishing cooperative relations.

Among arguments that provide grounds for experts’ pessimistic or skeptical assessments of cooperation prospects, one could list the following.

- 1) NATO’s readiness for cooperation will signal the organization’s possible support of integration processes in the CIS, with Russia playing the leading role, and recognition of Russia’s right to have its own special interests in this area. Even within the framework of such an assessment, constructive scenarios of cooperation between the two organizations are limited to resolution of the situation in and around Afghanistan. And even here, there are suspicions that the

US and its allies in NATO want to drag Russia and CSTO into the war in that country and thus split up both the burden and responsibility. But, as speculation goes, even if such a scenario plays out, it would have to be under the auspices of the United Nations, which would require a UN Security Council resolution. And even under such circumstances the signing of a cooperation agreement directly between CSTO and NATO is unlikely.

2) NATO has proven uncompromising in its preference to develop direct relations with the member states of CSTO rather than with the organization itself.

3) Cold War stereotypes continue to hold sway. At NATO it is a commonly held belief that CSTO was created by Russia with the aim of offsetting the alliance. Furthermore, Brussels, according to skeptics, continues on a course aimed at maintaining its “military-political monopoly”. The alliance does not intend to support the idea of coalitional military-political multi-polarity, particularly in Eurasia.

4) The “China factor” and the cooperation of Russia and several other CSTO members participating in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are additional considerations. In this regard, particular emphasis is given to the possible negative of Beijing to the development of relations between CSTO and NATO. In any case, Chinese concerns will be an issue and relations between Moscow and Beijing may cool. Furthermore, in assessing the various options for cooperation between CSTO and NATO, the views of other SCO member states and observers not participating in CSTO must be taken into consideration.

5) CSTO is not without its own problems. The organization has certain internal contradictions, including its geographical scope, as well as the insufficiently clear and active positioning of the organization in such a way as to provide a big-picture understanding of its plans and objectives for NATO.

6) NATO’s adherence to a course aimed at developing bilateral relations with individual CSTO member states reinforces suspicions that certain states are engaged in a double game. The countries, meeting with NATO behind Russia’s back, are supposedly placing an emphasis on their readiness to cooperate with the alliance through the Partnership for Peace program. Furthermore, there is some opposition within the organization to building relations with NATO. An agreement between CSTO and NATO is viewed in some countries as implying the transfer of certain functions to Russia, which plays a leading role in the organization, thus amounting to an infringement on their sovereignty in the realm of foreign affairs.

7) The plans of the US and NATO to expand their presence in the post-Soviet space, particularly in Central Asia, are not a good fit with the objective of

building relations with CSTO on the whole. These plans can be realized through bilateral relations with individual member countries of CSTO, which in turn as an organization is quite negative about separate relations. And such relations are a source of irritation that serves to reinforce within CSTO arguments against further development of relations with NATO.

8) CSTO continues to be perceived in the West as an organization which supports “authoritarian regimes” and some of its member states are qualified as such.

9) The “Belarus factor” is worth a separate mention. The critical attitude of the West toward the current leadership of Belarus presents an obstacle to cooperation with CSTO.

It seems that the recognition of the organization as an equal partner of NATO faces not only external but also internal obstacles. The latter arise not only from within the organization but also from the positions of a number of member countries, including Russia. At the same time, given the lack of progress in bilateral relations between the two security organizations, it is understandable that the silence in Brussels with regard to cooperation initiatives has resulted in a certain disappointment of the leadership of CSTO and Russia.

Experts’ efforts, including multidisciplinary efforts, to push the process of cooperation between the two organizations should be activated. Such efforts could be based on three “platforms” – 1) within Russia, 2) among experts of all CSTO member countries and 3) CSTO–NATO expert consultations.

Naturally, it would be problematic to launch a CSTO–NATO mechanism that differs from the themes Russia–NATO engagement, which has already made some substantial progress, and it will require more extensive efforts to achieve visible results. At the same time, it should be noted that a number of the problems that need to be resolved for the sake of developing relations between Russia and NATO are similar to the issues hindering CSTO–NATO cooperation. Proposals aimed at resolving these problems were put forward in INSOR’s report published last year – *Prospects for the Development of Russia–NATO Relations*.

Efforts made toward making this possible would be highly useful and not only limited to a framework relating to a mechanism for interaction between CSTO and NATO. Also implied here is the study and discussion of a wide range of security issues which could be resolved through the cooperation of these two organizations. CSTO–NATO discussions could very well broaden and elevate the scope of interaction to something much greater than, for example, cooperation on the Afghan situation. It could encompass Euro-Atlantic security from Vancouver to Vladivostok, a European security treaty, etc.

It is quite clear that bilateral cooperation is not a goal in and of itself. It follows that more than just dialogue and talk is needed; the dialogue must be topical and serious, focused on areas of mutual interest and value.

This dialogue could touch upon assessments of the advantages of each organization in addressing various common threats. For example, one of the advantages of CSTO is its mechanism for cooperation between various law-enforcement and special forces in the fight against terrorism. And in this area such cooperation is very expedient.

In terms of a step-by-step plan for the near future, we could consider the following.

While working on CSTO's doctrinal documents according to decisions made at the organization's most recent formal summit, it would be useful to explore the possibilities for aligning them with the new Strategic Concept of the North Atlantic alliance. We should not forget the experience of the NATO Expert Group which during the drafting of the new concept consulted with Russian colleagues. Likewise, CSTO-NATO dialogue could in part focus on the principles expressed in the doctrinal documents of CSTO.

Much of value for experts' efforts toward establishing CSTO-NATO dialogue can be found in the work of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Making use of these previous efforts would help optimize work and put the focus on the problems specifically concerning the relations of these two security organizations and the subsequent resolution of these problems.

For example, this concerns the issue of peacekeeping. Nearly a decade ago the NRC Peacekeeping Working Group agreed upon a document stipulating the "Political Aspects for a Generic Concept for Joint NATO-Russia Peacekeeping Operations."

An important practical task is the provision of at least some level of operation compatibility of the Collective Rapid Reaction Force and the Peacekeeping Force of CSTO with the NATO Response Force. An agenda needs to be drawn up to outline the steps necessary to achieve such operational compatibility between the two alliances.

It is possible to invite to trainings of CSTO's combined arms task forces not only observers from NATO and NATO member states but also incorporate training scenarios involving joint operations with NATO forces. It would be appropriate for starters to invite a small group (perhaps a platoon of paratroopers) from the NATO Response Force to work on operational coordination.

If we look at the current cooperation development between Russia and the US and Russia and NATO for Afghanistan, we see that it touches four areas. Firstly, intensive consultations on the future of Afghanistan. Secondly, the northern transit corridor. Thirdly, narcotics trafficking countermeasures. And, fourthly, cooperation within the NATO–Russia Council is largely focused on two aspects: training of Afghan policemen and antinarcotics specialists in Russia and issues related to repairing and maintaining the Afghan helicopter fleet.

It seems that cooperation along the Russia–NATO and Russia–US tracks is not going to be sufficient to find comprehensive solutions. Sooner or later the need will arise to establish full-fledged relations with CSTO. This organization has serious experience as well as the potential to make an important contribution in this difficult area of strengthening security.

At the same time, judging by the declarations of US and NATO officials, they are not against consultations with CSTO on Afghanistan, including on the narcotics trafficking issue. Furthermore, Washington and Brussels (just as Russia) are in search of new regional partners, besides Pakistan, for solving the Afghanistan problem as well as practical areas for cooperation and new methods of interaction. But at the same time, the customary caveat is always made about the need of the US and NATO to “understand the practical meaning” of cooperation with CSTO and “clarify what can be achieved” through such cooperation.

In this regard, even accepting the skeptical viewpoint that such remarks mask the clear lack of a desire on the part of Brussels and Washington to establish cooperative relations with CSTO, it would be prudent to once again raise the issue of the potential involvement of CSTO in regulating the situation in and around Afghanistan with specific rationale and proposals. And at the same time we should not make the appearances that we are engaging in this gratuitously; we should undertake this based on our own interests and concerns.

We should not lose sight of the fact that in recent years CSTO has become increasingly engaged in the Afghanistan issue. Also, Russia and other CSTO member states have experience dating back to the Soviet era as well as analytical capacity that could be used by NATO.

The expected withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014 brings with it the very difficult (and expensive) problem of strengthening the Tajik-Afghan and Uzbek-Afghan borders and continual patrolling by the Collective Rapid Response Force and Collective Operational Response Force north of the Afghan border. In fact, the training scenarios of these two military forces are largely built upon the hypothetical penetration by Taliban militants from the south.

A series of consultations and coordination meetings need to be held between CSTO and NATO and Russia and NATO on the gradual and agreed drawdown of NATO's presence in Afghanistan and the increased engagement of other actors in helping regulate and stabilize the situation.

Forces from CSTO countries should not engage on Afghan soil, but following the potential withdrawal of the international coalition many tasks will remain unfinished, and they can in part be handled by CSTO and from member-state territories in Central Asia (for example, expanded retraining of Afghan police, repair and maintenance of the helicopter fleet, continued provision of the "northern transport route" to support the missions of the United Nation, Red Cross and other international organizations in Afghanistan, etc.).

It should be recognized that given the current situation the withdrawal of the international coalition from Afghanistan will inevitably lead to the expansion of the Taliban, which will create a serious security problem for Central Asian countries as well as Russia. And Russia will find it extraordinarily difficult to deal with this threat without an international coalition component. Given such a situation, it is both necessary and possible to expand cooperation with NATO against the "Afghan threat". The present level of cooperation is a minimalist approach. Furthermore, with the exception of the direct participation of CSTO troops in military operations in Afghanistan (which should be avoided), all other forms of military cooperation with international forces in Afghanistan in the interest of stabilization can and should be undertaken: military logistics support, training (with trips to Russia and other CSTO countries as well as locally) of military and police personnel of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan, cooperation in the delivery and repair of arms and military equipment, provision of intelligence information, cooperation in air space control, cooperation in border protection, etc.

CSTO should be oriented toward new tactics, and not only new combat tactics, in such conflict regions as Afghanistan. CSTO's military preparations to prevent Taliban incursions into member countries in Central Asia will not produce the desired result without economic aid and assistance in the post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan in coordination with other international actors. The organization should prepare for a long-term program in the Afghanistan area in cooperation with the international forces and organizations which today make up the core of the coalition that is gradually being withdrawn from Afghanistan.

On the international level, the idea of establishing a *Coordination (Consultation) Council of Regional Organizations* seems to be promising. Such a council could serve as an information exchange between different regional organizations concerning security matters. The council could, for example, consist of CSTO, EU, OSCE, SCO, NATO and UN representatives. A permanent forum for

consultations and coordination of multifunctional regional organizations in Eurasia could significantly improve the level and quality of international cooperation.

Practical cooperation of CSTO with the UN, OSCE and other large international institutions on regulation of regional conflicts is the “touchstone” by which established and large international organizations and leading countries will assess whether CSTO’s actions bring any “added value” to international security.

The situation in and around Afghanistan is the most obvious area for the cooperation of international and regional organizations. With respect to the curtailing of the international anti-terrorism coalition’s mission in Afghanistan, CSTO will inevitably be obliged to play more a active part in the region of Central Asia bordering Afghanistan. It is necessary to find solutions to the following problems: drug trafficking; incursions of Islamic extremists from Afghanistan territory onto neighboring countries with the aim of destabilization of situation in the Central Asian region; intensification of border patrols and border protection; rendering technical assistance to Afghan ministries and departments – assistance in re-establishment of economical infrastructure in Afghanistan, training of customs, border patrol, anti-drug and other government agency employees, military and technical cooperation, etc.

Similar to cooperation with NATO and the EU, in the post-Soviet space, with the aim of responding to threats coming from the territory of Afghanistan, it might be possible to create a coalition of CSTO and SCO on cooperation in the Afghan area. It should be remembered that CSTO and SCO functions in response to new challenges and threats overlap and are duplicated in many ways. That said, it is CSTO that already has real mechanisms for responding to these threats. Furthermore, among SCO members and observers there are states that have a vested interest in the regulation of the situation in Afghanistan. Besides, SCO has greater international and political authority, than CSTO. In this regard, the creation of a CSTO–SCO coalition for responding to the Afghan threat could have significant advantages for both organizations – combining CSTO’s actual functional capacity with the international and political authority of SCO.

One more important area for increasing CSTO’s efficiency should be development of the peacemaking potential of the organization. The participation of great states and large international organizations in peacemaking, regulation of conflicts and peaceful post-conflict restoration is the most important indicator by which the global role of countries and organizations is evaluated. One of key priorities of SCTO is peacekeeping, which will strengthen the trust and interest of the global community and international structures as well as enhance its role and create a serious impulse for cooperation with other partners. The latter is

directly related to its strategy of joint crisis response, which was developed at the December 2010 CSTO summit and informal summit of the organization in August 2011.

CSTO could take on significant peacemaking functions. At that, it is natural that participation in international peacemaking should be based, above all else, on the security interests of CSTO member states, even in case of actions outside its given geographical area of responsibility. Creation of CSTO's CRRF and Peacemaking Forces will be perceived by the global community as reasonable (not threatening), if their functions include use (at least partially) in accordance with UN mandates in regions where the UN does not have enough resources of its own.

CSTO decisions and announcements made in December 2010 concerning activation of the peacemaking potential of the organization, possibilities for operations under a UN mandate and the creation of CSTO's peacemaking forces could undermine the internal political consensus of the organization if such activities were to be held on the territory of member states. At the same time "external peacemaking" in coordination with the UN could significantly strengthen CSTO's positions.

In this regard, activation of CSTO's peacemaking activity should not be limited to the development of military means (creation of Peacekeeping Forces). The initial involvement of non-military ministries, consolidation of humanitarian, technical and medical aid facilities, and involvement of teaching specialists are prerequisite. Given such an approach, CSTO's inclusion in nonmilitary UN missions and performance of joint missions with the EU is possible in a rather wide geopolitical context.

It is quite clear that realization of peacemaking functions should be harmonized with CSTO's cooperation with other international structures, first of all and mainly with the UN. In order to build upon the UN resolution related to CSTO in 2010 and other UN–CSTO cooperation documents, it is necessary to *activate further interaction with United Nations Department of Peacemaking Operations*.

At the same time, it is also important to keep in mind that the *issue of confirmation of CSTO operations legitimacy* needs special care and attention from the viewpoint of international law.

Within the framework of strengthening of cooperation with the UN, it seems that it would be particularly useful to "rebrand" CSTO activity from the viewpoint of world public opinion and international law. It is reasonable to position and arrange anti-narcotics, anti-terrorist, border studies and other CSTO operations ("Channel", "Illegal", etc.) as UN-mandated "CSTO operations."

Seeing that NATO and EU are repackaging their activity in conflict areas into the activities of regional organizations acting under the auspices of the UN, it becomes politically profitable to reorganize entire training programs and other activities as operations coordinated with the UN, which in modern Eurasia would become a key “indicator” of regional structures’ effectiveness and influence.

In the course of further development of the organization’s fundamental documents, creation of a new Strategic Concept for CSTO and amendment of peacemaking documents, the following issues should be taken into account.

It would be prudent to align CSTO’s peacemaking documents with the core principles of the following:

- United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines, 2008;
- Generic Concept for Joint NATO–Russia Peacekeeping Operations and NATO’s new Strategic Concept of NATO, 2010;
- CIS Model Law on Peacemaking Operations of CIS Member States, 2005 (which should be adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of CSTO as appropriate for the organization’s specific nature);
- Russian Federal Law on Peacemaking Operations, 1995.

Attention should be paid to task sharing between the branches of power stipulated by the CIS Model Law on Peacemaking Operations concerning decision making in the course of preparation, execution and completion of operations: some decisions are said to be in the presidents’ competence, others in the legislative realm and yet others subject to the ministries of foreign affairs and defense.

At the same time, it would be useful to:

- develop and sign a *CSTO conventional agreement with UN* on configuration, types and scales of forces that the organization is ready to provide upon UN request for deployment to conflict zones. In this regard, it would be reasonable to study a number of NATO–UN agreements on the use of contingents and command structures of the alliance in former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Libya;
- create a *CSTO integrated database* of civil, police, military, medical, technical and other personnel and list of equipment and transport reserves

of member states are allocated for quick mobilization in case of operation need;

- perform *preliminary certification of the compatibility and qualification* of certain military units, divisions and formations that different member states are ready to provide for CSTO Peacekeeping Forces in crisis situations. Such units should regularly receive training and compatibility assessment. Following the experience of creating semi-strategic formations of the EU, one can single out “leading” member states of the organization and subdivisions of these states, which in turn can select subdivisions of other states (out of forces allocated by these states to the Peacekeeping Forces), train them, certify them, and take responsibility for their cohesion and operational compatibility.

As security structures in the Euro-Atlantic region are rather heterogeneous in nature, it seems reasonable to begin with an initiative aimed at universalization of existing security structures, starting with *the creation of a universal mechanism of joint (not competitive) monitoring in regional conflict zones on the basis of a common mandate of the UN*.

In particular, the six main organizations in the sphere of security presented in Euro-Atlantic region (UN, OSCE, EU, NATO, CSTO and SCO) can be represented in regional conflict zones by a *united observation mission as per an agreement on the basis of a common UN mandate*, which could significantly reduce the lack of coordination of efforts by various actors in conflict regulation.

Formation of CSTO’s peacemaking potential should be augmented by the creation of *CSTO observation missions* system in conflict regions, *CSTO fact-finding missions* and *CSTO intermediary missions* making use of the experience of the UN and OSCE.

With the aim of constant monitoring in the sphere of security and better coordination of the positions of member states among themselves and with external partners, it would be appropriate *to propose establishing the institution of special CSTO representatives*.

Lately, foreign-policy coordination has increased within CSTO, evidenced by the growth of member states’ readiness and interest to elaborate and implement a common position in relation to other international organizations on many important regional and global issues. The presentation of CSTO’s common position to regional and extra-regional partners via special representatives will make CSTO more prominent at the international scene and will make it possible to assert that the organization is indeed a consolidated structure.

CSTO member states often complain that OSCE and other international organizations publish reports of an accusatory nature, where the position of Russia and its partners is often interpreted in an unflattering way. However, apart for references to such facts, the alternative versions are not forthcoming. Publications of open reports prepared by CSTO representatives on certain critical situations and the results of fact-finding missions could fill in this lacuna in the global information environment.

Depending on the goals set, it may be prudent to appoint special representatives in the following areas:

- a Special representative for interaction with international structures in CSTO area of responsibility;
- Special representatives for interaction with international structures outside CSTO's area of responsibility; special representative for cooperation with the UN and OSCE; special representative for cooperation with the EU and NATO; special representative for cooperation with the OIC, League of Arab States and African Union;
- Special representative for the Afghan situation;
- Special representative for the South Caucasus;
- Special representative for interaction with CIS states not in CSTO (or for cooperation with other regional organizations of CIS member states).

CSTO cannot be the sole mechanism of military and political security provision for new independent states united into a military and political union with Russia. However, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, keeping and developing unique functions of security provision of a group of states united in their efforts, can and should become one of the key elements of a new multifunctional system of collective security of Eurasian scope and scale.

Closer cooperation with international organizations, functional operations beyond the post-Soviet space, striving to stay up to speed with modern military technologies, assimilate of network technologies and participate in modern international operations of the international community in crisis regions and build upon world experience – all of these things could help CSTO structures and programs become an important component in the modernization of its countries and communities. While this mainly applies to security and military affairs, “adjacent fields” such as the development of technologies, joint training

and adjustment of mechanisms of international cooperation are also poised to reap benefits.

CSTO can and should become *a tool for the achievement of “operational compatibility” (in the widest socio-political sense) of CSTO member states with other leading states and international organizations of the world.*