This article was published in Rossiyskaya Gazeta on November 6, 2008.
 
Today’s worldwide crisis calls for integrated restructuring of the old and ineffective system of international governance. It brings great harm to many, but at the same time clears many blockages, and demands fresh thinking and new approaches, in particular with regard to the relations between Russia and the European Union (EU).
 
For Russia and the countries of the EU, the saving of the positive elements in their relations, and the elevating of these relations to a higher level in terms of their quality are of vital importance. But these relations need a new philosophy, the basis of which should be an understanding that, ultimately, not just strategic partnership, but strategic union – based on equal rights and global responsibility – can prevent the relative marginalization of the EU and Russia in conditions of contraction (for the EU) and maximal saving (for Russia) of the perspective shares of world GDP, and ensure stability in the face of the callings and threats of the world in the future and strengthening of their positive roles in the internationally.
 
If isolated from one another, and of course in a climate of rivalry between Russia and Europe, neither country will be able to claim a role of a first-class center of strength in the future world order comparable with the US or China, instead becoming objects of politics of external forces. By virtue of the interconnectedness of the economic, political-diplomatic, military-political, and geopolitical potential of both parties, a similar world ‘pole’ can only come in the form of a union of Russia and the EU. We are united by unified culture, history and religious roots. Europe is one of the main sources of Russian civilization and identity, and of Russian societal and cultural modernization. For the contemporary EU, Russia is a large and unified extra external resource of geopolitical power, which will become an economic and political “personality” in the world of the future.
 
Over the years, Russia and the EU have built up significant experience of constructive interaction on the majority of questions of political and economic relations. But we shall be frank. For now these relations are at a dead-end. This is leading to the “provincialization” and degradation of the Russia-EU agenda, and lowering the ability and desires of both sides to compromise on current questions on the agenda or to overcome the logic of the zero-sum game, while increasing the dependency of their interaction against external factors. The officially announced objective is strategic partnership. However, given the current conceptual vacuum and the level of competition and even rivalry, this objective is not all that enabling, even upon signing corresponding documents to bring relations into compliance with the long-term demands of the sides in the dynamic world of the future.
 
Disappointment is hindering the formulation of a single and constructive long-term political strategy of the EU for relations with Russia - disappointment about our country not going the liberal-democratic route taken by Central and Eastern European countries; there is also misunderstanding in terms of how Brussels should interact with Russia. For the majority of Russian politicians, what remains unclear is the role and the place of the EU in the process of integrated modernization of the Russian economy and community, and the strengthening of Russia on the road to contemporary development. In Russia they do not know what we want from the EU. There is no agreement with regard to what social-economic model is necessary for the development of Russia. In the country, though only on the surface and of which little is heard, there exists a mood in favor of a non-European road of development - a choice against the construction of a judicial state, development of democracy, and a fight against corruption.
 
One of the most noticeable negative external factors for relations between Russia and the EU could be a continuation of the confrontational tendencies in Russia-US relations and the return of the military dimension in European politics. The support of the confrontational politics of the US in the situation with Georgia, which the EU showed early on in August of this year, produced a negative impression of Europe in Russia, tarnishing the traditional attractiveness of the “European model” in the eyes of Russian citizens.
 
The president of France – and current chairman of the EU – partly corrected that situation, coming forward as a de facto mediator in the conflict between Russia and the US. Simultaneously he seriously increased the international weight of the EU. This shows that Russia is ultimately interested in the growth of subjectivity of the EU in international relations in the sphere of security, and is not interested in a continuation of the contraction of the EU on the international-political level, which has been witnessed for around ten years now. This interest is underlined now, it appears, by the already proven inability of NATO to move away from its Cold War roots, to become constructive, and to not produce mistrust and new divisions of strength in Europe.
 
In such a situation work on a new strategic agreement with the EU could turn out to be premature, possibly bringing more harm than good. Both sides not only do not understand what model of interaction they would like to have in, say, ten years time. Fundamentally different also are their current approaches to the form of the agreement which they would plan to develop. Brussels is set on building a future agreement with Russia mainly in the form of and similar to the current Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation, but this agreement does not correspond to today’s or the future’s real world economics and politics.
 
The parties have taken different approaches to understanding the philosophy and essence of this document and have suggested dramatically different document setup and content patterns. Russia wanted it to be rather concise and to contain the key principles and goals of cooperation with the EU. It was also meant to serve as a basis for detailed cooperation agreements between various industries on a broad range of cooperation options. The EU preferred it to be a uniform comprehensive agreement with a logical thread between all its sections, and imposing concrete obligations on all types of cooperation between the parties. Certain requirements suggested by the EU run counter to Russia’s interests. These requirements comprise the EU’s intention to stipulate in the future agreement Russia’s obligations related to the energy sector, which are shaped in accordance with certain articles of the Energy Charter Treaty, which is totally unacceptable for Moscow.
 
The anti-Russian coalition in the EU and its supporters are sure to conduct these negotiations in the most inefficient way possible. In case the parties do manage to work out and sign a text, the nature of the relationship between Russia and some new EU members, combined with the diversity of the EU members, will hinder the ratification of such a text. In order to develop a new philosophy and strategy, the relationship needs to be given a break. The same suggestion concerns negotiations on the new agreement. At the same time, the parties should use new and innovative patterns of communication.
 
The possible key issues to be discussed: the role of Russia and Europe in the global scope, the presence of similar strategic interests and the basis for their joint implementation, and identification of ways to enhance mutual trust.
 
A pause in the negotiations on the new strategic partnership will not have any negative impact on trade, economic or political relations between Russia and certain EU members. It is necessary to intensify and bring to a new level the dialogue between governments, expert communities, business, and civil society in order to take joint efforts to understand what we want from each other, and what type of relationship we want to develop in future, in addition to a vague “strategic partnership”. The dialogue should be democratized and expanded.
 
We should not repeat the experience of the four so-called “road-maps”, which sounded impressive, but have long since been forgotten by everyone except their authors. These “road-maps” patched up the problems, but did not facilitate a move forward. During the break we should intensify cooperation with certain EU countries.
 
Russia and the EU must build their energy partnership in many stages, and should facilitate the formation of the European energy complex based on combined ownership of business units and joint management of development and distribution of gas and other energy commodities. In such circumstances the key reason for speculation around “energy security” and “energy imperialism” will cease to be a stumbling block. In reality the pressure put on Russia on energy issues does not cause friction because of what is discussed, but because it is clear that the intention is to get as much cheap oil and gas as possible. In case of the establishment of a uniform energy complex, end-users, controlling bodies and manufacturers overseeing distribution would have an equal interest in setting relevant energy rates, and it would be used in a more efficient way. In case of formation of an energy union comprising Russia and the EU, Europe would gain energy independence and substantially enhance its international position.
 
Close cooperation between Russia and the EU on vital strategic issues must develop into another cornerstone of the future union. The bulk of both side’s interests must coincide. Thus, the parties must avoid a new militarization of European politics, work against climate change, avoid large-scale wars – especially now during the current efforts to rearrange the world order – prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, protect universal values and institutions, commit to peaceful settlement of inter-state and internal conflicts, and promote stability in the Middle East. And of course – work towards a single market between Russia and the EU.
 
Our interests also coincide when it comes to anti-terrorist operations, the fight against trafficking and distribution of drugs, and joint use of space for peaceful purposes. It is also possible and necessary to bridge interests and politics while developing a new pattern of world management.
 
After the break we should proceed with the preparation of a possible agreement on strategic union, and to use this break to identify the union’s conceptual basis.
 
The union between Russia and the EU – the Union of Europe – must not hinder other elements of the future European architecture. The Union should instead complement such elements. For example, the Humanitarian European Council. We do not think that the EU members will soon be abandoning the military and political union with the US, which exists within the framework of NATO. Russia will enhance cooperation with Asian states as part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.
 
The Union of Europe could facilitate in the artificial choice between Russia or Europe for the countries located between the EU and Russia: Ukraine, the trans-Caucasus countries, and countries of ex-Soviet central Asia and also Turkey. The Union of Europe and NATO and the Council of Europe could operate under the guidance of a new all-European agreement (Helsinki-2), which is supported by Russia.
 
We are aware of the fact that we, those who are proposing the formation of a Union of Europe in such hard times, will be accused of starry-eyed idealism. However, the new world calls for such grand ideas so as to make breakthroughs in the future. Otherwise we run the risk of getting stuck in the past or getting lost in the future world.
 
For both Russia and the EU countries, it is crucial to maintain a positive relationship and to move to a higher level.

By Igor Yurgens.